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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003857

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [IZ](#) [TU](#) [PREL](#) [MARR](#)
SUBJECT: IRAQ-TURKEY-US TRILATERAL: SIGNS OF COMMITMENT; NO
CONCRETE ACTION YET (CORRECTED TITLE)

REF: A. BAGHDAD 3710
[1](#)B. BAGHDAD 3793

Classified By: POL-MIL Minister Counselor Michael H. Corbin
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) SUMMARY: The second working level meeting of the Iraq-Turkey U.S. security trilat December 4 offered some encouraging signs of commitment from the parties but was short on practical steps. Unlike the previous week, the GOI delegation included both Kurdish Regional Government and Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement representatives. Discussion featured an energetic debate among GOI and KRG reps as to the depth and value of KRG intel on the PKK which suggested both GOI skepticism and a desire to produce intel of value. The Turks presented for consideration a Terms of Reference document (based largely on an earlier U.S. draft) meant to detail the committee's goals, membership, and procedures, which all participants agreed to review with an eye toward settling on a text by the next session December [1](#)18. Under gentle prodding from the U.S., the Turks and Iraqis agreed to join MNF-I in bringing to the next session intelligence reports for sharing, to help the Turks and Iraqis determine where the information gaps lie and what each side has to offer. End summary.

[1](#)2. (C) The second working-level session of the Baghdad-based trilateral committee on combating the PKK convened December [1](#)4. This meeting followed the 19 November ministerial (in which a senior Kurdish Regional Government representative participated) that called for establishment of the working-level committee (ref A), and the 29 November initial session of the working-level committee (ref B) which was hamstrung by the absence of KRG representatives. Iraq's delegation at the December 4 session was headed by Major General Abdul Salam Ifkika, Director of the Ministry of State for National Security Affairs' National Joint Operations Center. He was joined by KRG representative Brigadier General Delshad Najiband and representatives of the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement (DBE); Military Intelligence; National Information and Investigation Agency; and the Office of the National Security Advisor. Turkey was represented by Defense Attach Colonel Cengiz Ozen and Deputy Chief of Mission Sencer Yondem plus A/DATT and polmiloff. The U.S. was represented by Deputy Pol-Mil Counselor Philip Kosnett and Colonel Richard Stockhausen of MNF-I CJ3 (Operations) plus polmiloffs.

[1](#)3. (C) Discussion opened with a round of statements at which all declared their commitment to making the trilat a venue for practical information sharing, with the U.S. rep in particular urging rapid movement toward the practical exchange or information. The meeting featured an energetic debate among GOI and KRG reps as to the depth and value of KRG intel on the PKK, with several Iraqi reps expressing

skepticism that the KRG would actually present useful information. The three sides pledged to complete staffing of the committee, including via the naming of Turkish and U.S. one-star general officers as co-chairs. The Turks presented for consideration a Terms of Reference document (based largely on an earlier informal U.S. draft) meant to detail the committee's goals, membership, and scope of action, which all participants agreed to review with an eye toward settling on a text by the next scheduled session December 18 (skipping a week due to the Eid al-Adha/Kurban Bayrami holiday). Turkish DCM Yondem noted that Ankara required agreed ToR before the Turkish delegation could continue to participate in the committee.

14. (S) A discussion of intelligence sharing mechanisms led to an Iraqi request for U.S. provision of secure communications equipment for the committee, which the U.S. side deferred for later consideration. The U.S. rep noted that as the U.S. had existing, robust bilateral intel sharing mechanisms with both Iraq and Turkey, the greatest value of the committee was as an avenue for boosting Turkish-Iraqi intelligence cooperation. The Turks endorsed this view. (COMMENT: It may well be in U.S. interest to discuss providing technical assistance to a Turkish-Iraqi classified communications initiative, but we do not wish the absence of such a mechanism now to become an excuse for any participant to delay implementation of intel exchange under the trilateral umbrella. END COMMENT.) For now at least, the parties have agreed to rely on face-to-face meetings and couriers. At the meeting's conclusion, all teams agreed that at the next meeting, each delegation should commence the sharing of

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representative intelligence report on the PKK to help the committee members identify gaps in coverage and work toward a common understanding of the committee's role.

15. (C) COMMENT: An encouraging session, but the next one needs to achieve agreement on terms of reference and get on with the business of exchanging intelligence. We believe all participants want to give the committee a chance to work on their own terms but the Turks and Iraqis are skeptical of the other's commitment. The Turks are concerned that the existence of this trilateral mechanism not interfere with successful U.S.-Turkey bilateral intel exchange, while the Iraqis are clear that they expect to receive as well as provide intel. We should find out soon whether the GOI/KRG and GOT can overcome suspicion and act in concert against the PKK all claim to oppose. END COMMENT.
CROCKER